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ABSTRACT
Statistical discrimination is a form of discrimination that uses statistical inferences about
the groups to which individuals belong as grounds for treating them differently. It remains unclear
what, if anything, makes statistical discrimination wrong. My thesis argues that statistical
discrimination is wrong because, and insofar as, it contributes to existing social injustice. After an
introduction to the issues in section 1, section 2 clarifies the concept of statistical discrimination
and its differences with non-statistical discrimination. Section 3 discusses different accounts that
seek to explain when and why statistical discrimination is wrong. I examine two approaches, one
of which regards the wrong of statistical discrimination as part of discrimination in general, while
the other conceives of the wrong as distinctive to statistical discrimination itself. I argue the former
approach is better. Among different accounts within the approach, the context-based
consequentialist account that explains the wrong in relation to existing social injustice is most
promising. Section 4 uses racial profiling as an example to illustrate how the account can help
explain this hard case of statistical discrimination, calling upon an argument developed by
Benjamin Eidelson.
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WHAT IS WRONG WITH STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION?
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1

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays people, organizations, and governments increasingly rely on statistics and
algorithms to make important decisions and policies. While utilizing statistical information might
help avoid some forms of subjective bias, it also makes individuals more vulnerable to statistical
discrimination, a form of discrimination that uses statistical inferences about the social groups to
which persons belong as grounds for treating them differently. Although many people hold that
statistical discrimination is objectionable, it is not clear what makes it wrong.
In this thesis, I argue that a context-based consequentialist account is a promising
explanation for the wrong of statistical discrimination. The account conceptualizes the wrong of
statistical discrimination in terms of its contribution to existing social injustice against
disadvantaged social groups. In Section 2, I clarify what statistical discrimination is and compare
it with non-statistical discrimination. Section 3 discusses two approaches to account for when
and why statistical discrimination is wrong. One approach argues that statistical discrimination
constitutes a distinct form of wrong, one not shared by other forms of discrimination, namely, the
wrong of imposing a cost on persons for features they do not have. A second approach explains
the wrong of statistical discrimination as an instance of a general wrong shared by all forms of
discrimination. I argue that the general-wrong approach is preferable and that, among different
accounts within this approach, a consequentialist account has notable advantages. In Section 4, I
illustrate how the consequentialist account can offer an illuminating way to understand the moral
troubling features of the hard cases of statistical discrimination by defending Eidelson’s
argument against racial profiling.
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2.1

2

WHAT IS STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION?

The Definition for Statistical Discrimination
The term ‘statistical discrimination’ was first used by the economist Edmund Phelps

(1972). It initially referred to the behaviors of employers when they made hiring decisions using
statistical information about a group to which applicants belong in order to infer what their job
productivity would likely be (Rodgers, 2009, p.223). Lippert-Rasmussen (2007; 2011; 2014)
generalizes the Arrow-Phelps account, presenting a definition of statistical discrimination that I
adopt for this thesis. On his definition, “A policy, P, constitutes statistical discrimination against
a certain socially salient group of people, X-people, in relation to non-X-people . . . if, and only
if, (i) there is statistical evidence which suggests that X-people differ from non-X-people in
dimension, D, (ii) P involves treating X-people worse than non-X-people, and (iii) P is in place
because of (i)” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2007, p.387). Note that this definition is not moralized, in
the sense that it leaves open whether statistical discrimination is necessarily wrong.
Accordingly, there are three conditions for actions or policies to be statistical
discrimination. First, there is a condition of disadvantageous treatment. The policy or action
treats members of a group in a way that disadvantages them in comparison with nonmembers.
Disadvantages include both deprivations of access to resources, opportunities and services, and
the imposition of costs. The second condition is about socially salient group membership. The
group targeted for disadvantageous treatment needs to be a socially salient group. A group is
socially salient if “it is important to the structure of social interactions across a wide range of
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social contexts” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2007, p.386), such as groups based on sex, race, color,
religion, and disability. By contrast, people whose blood type is AB are not a socially salient
group. This restriction is necessary because without it any differential treatment imposing
disadvantages on some persons, such as colleges accepting some applicants and rejecting others,
would be discriminatory.1 The third condition is about the role of statistical evidence. The
treatment must be motivated and grounded (at least partly) by the agent’s belief in a statistical
correlation between membership in a socially salient group and some other attribute, such as
productivity or criminal behavior. Note that there is no criterion in the definition for the
statistical evidence grounding discriminatory treatment to be epistemically dubious or biased.
Instead, the statistical evidence may accurately describe the relevant difference between social
groups and be used in a non-biased way.2

2.2

The Differences between Statistical Discrimination and Other Forms of
Discrimination
Before moving on to a discussion on what makes statistical discrimination wrong, if and

when it is wrong, it is worth taking a look at the difference between statistical and other forms of
discrimination. Suppose there are two cases of discrimination (C1) and (C2).
Case (C1): The employer of a company rejects a female applicant because he receives
and believes the statistical evidence from company research showing that the average
productivity (measured by output) of female employees is lower than that of male employees.

1

There is a debate about which socially salient groups count in discrimination and whether there should be a group restriction at
all (see Altman (2020) and Thomsen (2013)), but I bracket such complexity in this paper.
2
By “non-biased” I mean all available relevant statistical evidence is taken into account and the information is not used in a
selective way.
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Case (C2): The employer of a company rejects a female applicant because the sacred text
of his religion says that God does not want women to work outside of home.
Both employers in (C1) and (C2) engage in discrimination against women. The employer
in (C1) engages in statistical discrimination according to our definition, but the employer in (C2)
does not. The main difference between statistical discrimination and non-statistical
discrimination is in the third condition spelled out at the end of 2.1, namely, the role of evidence.
While statistical discrimination is motivated and grounded by belief in statistical evidence about
the correlation between social group membership and particular attributes, non-statistical
discrimination is motivated by other attitudes, such as hostility towards certain social groups or
belief in the inferior moral status of the groups. But what difference does the use of statistical
evidence make to the nature of statistical discrimination?
First, statistical discrimination is arguably less likely than other forms of discrimination
to involve an intention to disadvantage the members of the group in question.3 It is true that, as
Pauline T. Kim points out, statistical discrimination can be intentional, as when the agent relies
on algorithms to make decisions because “it knows the model produces a discriminatory result
and intends that results to occur” (Kim, 2016, p.884). However, usually, the agent engaging in
statistical discrimination does not intend to disadvantage the group. Given the same statistical
estimation of productivity, the employer in (C1) might be equally willing to hire female as male
applicants. In fact, one reason given for using statistics in employment is to reduce intentional
discrimination in decision-making.
Second, the use of statistical evidence introduces a form of uncertainty that non-statistical
discrimination is less likely to have. The statistical evidence is almost always probabilistic,

3

Not all form of non-statistical discrimination involves discriminatory intention, but many of them do.
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where the probability is less than 100% (otherwise the grounds for the treatment would not be
statistical). Therefore, it is almost always possible that a member of the group does not share the
attributes as predicted, and the discriminator will typically acknowledge this empirical
possibility, because he knows that he is relying on statistical evidence. If the employer in (C1)
rejects all female applicants based on the evidence that 80% of female employees are less
productive than an average male employee, he knows that he might dismiss a female applicant
who belongs to the remaining 20%, and thus, from his own perspective, he would recognize that
there is a non-negligible probability that he has made a mistake and failed in his attempt to
maximize productivity. By contrast, the decision of the employer in (C2) does not rest on
probabilistic inferences of from statistical premises: his sacred text says that no women are
allowed by God to work outside of home and that is the end of the matter for him, he will not
acknowledge that he has made a mistake in dismissing a female applicant.

3

WHAT IS WRONG WITH STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION?

In this section, I compare some influential accounts of what makes statistical
discrimination wrong, when it is wrong. Those accounts can be divided into two approaches. The
first argues that there is something distinctive about statistical discrimination that constitutes a
different kind of wrong from discrimination in general. I call it the “distinct-wrong” approach.
The second approach contends that statistical discrimination is the same kind of wrong as
discrimination in general, which I term as the “general-wrong” approach.
3.1

A Minimal Standard for A Satisfactory Answer
Before evaluating which approach does a better job, a question to be considered is: What

counts as a good account of the moral wrong of statistical discrimination? The problem arises
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because supporters of different normative ethical theories, such as deontology and
consequentialism, may disagree about what counts as a good account. Debate about what makes
statistical discrimination wrong can partly stem from the debate on normative ethical theories,
and therefore may seem unresolvable without judging which normative ethical theory is better. It
makes no sense to argue for the superiority of a consequentialist account of what makes
statistical discrimination wrong, over other explanations, just based on consequentialist ethical
principles. Such arguments cannot convince those who commit to different ethical theories.
Given that this thesis cannot and does not intend to settle the long-standing debate between
different normative ethical theories, a set of evaluation criteria independent of any specific
normative ethical theory is needed for the project of the thesis. At the same time, I assume that
the different theories that are part of the philosophical tradition all have some plausibility, even if
the question of which is best remains unsettled.
To answer the question about what makes statistical discrimination wrong is to find a
property P such that P can explain why instances of statistical discrimination are wrong when
they are wrong. I propose the following three criteria for candidate property P.
(S1) P is present in paradigm cases of wrongful statistical discrimination, where
“paradigm cases” refer to cases that most people would agree to regard as statistical
discrimination that is morally wrong.
(S2) P is absent in cases that can be uncontroversially regarded as morally
unproblematic.4
(S3) P is plausibly regarded as a wrong-making property.

4

Note that it does not imply all cases where P is absent are not morally wrong, because there may be other properties that can
make a treatment wrong.
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The three criteria are in no way a complete set of criteria for an ideal account of the moral
wrong of statistical discrimination, but they can serve as a minimal threshold. Meeting those
criteria does not make an account satisfactory5, but the failure to meet them suffices to prove an
account as unsatisfactory. If one account can meet the criteria, whereas another account fails to
do so, then we have reasons to prefer the former account to the latter one.
One problem for applying the criteria is to determine what counts as a paradigm case of
wrongful statistical discrimination. Some instances of statistical discrimination are controversial
in terms of whether they are morally wrong or not, and as a result they cannot serve as a
paradigm test case. Recall the case (C1) I discussed in last section.
(C1) Other things equal, the employer of a company rejects a female applicant because
he receives and believes the statistical evidence from company research showing that the average
productivity (measured by output) of female employees is lower than that of male employees.
(Let’s assume that the main cause for the difference is that females undertake more housework
and childcare after going home, which results in a decrease in their energy at work, and that the
employer knows that this is the cause.)
I suppose most reasonable people will agree that the behavior of the employer in the case
is morally problematic. It is possible that some may perceive the treatment as legitimate, but I
believe those will be in the minority and it is difficult to offer a forceful justification for the
treatment. Therefore, I will use (C1) as a paradigm case of wrongful statistical for my analysis.
In the next section, I will apply the above set of criteria to assess different approaches to the
question of what makes statistical discrimination wrong.

5

There are different ways for an account to be “satisfactory”. I regard an account as satisfactory if it can give an explanation for
when and why statistical discrimination is wrong that is consistent, can capture the moral significance of the phenomenon, and
does not deviate too far from people’s moral intuitions.
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The Distinct-Wrong Approach
The first approach to explain the wrong of statistical discrimination is the distinct wrong

approach. This approach claims that the wrong of statistical discrimination is different or partly
different from the wrong of non-statistical discrimination.6 In other words, there is something
distinctive about statistical discrimination that makes it wrong, regardless of whether and why
discrimination in general is wrong. I have shown in my previous discussion that any difference
between statistical discrimination and other forms stems from the difference in the role of
statistical evidence. If the distinct-wrong approach is right, then there is something wrong with
using statistical evidence to ground differential treatment.
One argument adopting this approach is that statistical discrimination imposes costs on
one individual for the features of others. The principle underlying this argument is that one can
only legitimately be held accountable for all and only those events for which she is responsible.
A person is usually not responsible for the features of others. Consider the argument of Colyvan
et al. (2001), who point out that convicting someone based on evidence about the behavior of
others who are believed to be similar to the person in relevant respects, instead of evidence about
the person’s own previous behavior, is unfair and unjust. Statistical discrimination seems to
commit a similar wrong. To see how this is the case, consider the paradigm case (C1). Suppose
the statistical evidence the employer receives shows that 80% of female employees are less
productive than an average male employee and the statistical evidence is accurate. Still, 20%

6

Whether the wrong of statistical discrimination is entirely or partly different from the wrong of non-statistical discrimination
depends on which theory about the wrong of non-statistical discrimination to take. Some might think that the wrong of nonstatistical discrimination consists in its disadvantageous consequences, which are shared by statistical discrimination. Then there
are two parts in the wrong of statistical discrimination, the part shared by all forms of discrimination and the part distinct to
statistical discrimination, for which it is partly different from the wrong of general discrimination. Others might think that the
wrong of non-statistical discrimination consists in discriminatory intention or other attributes that statistical discrimination does
not necessarily share. Then the wrong of statistical discrimination can be totally different from the wrong of general
discrimination. Still, both views admit that part of the wrong of statistical discrimination is distinct to itself.
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female applicants are in fact at least as productive as an average male employee. Then the female
applicants who are rejected for the job but in fact belong to the 20% are disadvantaged for the
low productivity of other women rather than for their own productivity. This seems to be a
wrong to those women.7
One might ask why this is a wrong that is distinctive to statistical discrimination,
different from the wrong of general discrimination. This is because discrimination that is not
grounded on statistical evidence does not necessarily impose costs on persons for features they
do not have. Unlike the employer in (C1), the employer in (C2) does not disadvantage some
female applicants for the features of other women; rather, he dismisses female applicants because
of his belief that he should follow what his sacred text says about the role God assigned to every
woman.
It is important to note that, in fact, the wrong of punishing or otherwise disadvantaging
persons for the features of others does not rest on differential treatment of social groups. Equal
treatment of different social groups can commit the same wrong. For instance, suppose an
employer reduces the salary of all employees based on the evidence that half of the employees
leave early. In this case, the treatment is equal: all employees, both male and female, suffer
undue cost. Still, half of the employees who do not leave early would be punished for the
behavior of others, which is also unfair. Thus, it seems that, according to Colyvan’s distinctwrong account, what makes statistical discrimination wrong is its reliance on statistical
generalization rather than its discriminatory feature, that is, its feature of unjustifiably treating
some worse than others.

7

An account distinct from Colyvan’s account would claim that the reliance on statistical inferences can be morally
nonproblematic when it relies on all available information that can be acquired without unreasonable cost. Such account is
superior to Colyvan’s account and could play a role in a mixed consequential-deontological theory, however I do not have space
to further explore it.
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Additionally, the explanation does not distinguish wrongful statistical discrimination
from morally acceptable uses of statistical information. Specifically, there are cases that rely on
statistical inference and are likely to impose costs on persons for features the person does not
have, but those cases are normally regarded as morally acceptable. This is incompatible with the
criterion (S2) for an acceptable account of the wrong of discrimination.
To see how it is the case, consider other generalizations we use in our lives. All forms of
generalization that infer the attributes of an individual from the attributes of other similar
individuals seem to involve the possibility of error. Any decision that relies on generalization is
likely to disadvantage some persons for attributes that they are predicted to have but actually do
not have. We routinely rely on statistical generalization. When we make a decision regarding
persons, there is always a property or a set of properties (property X) that is essential for making
the decision. However, often we cannot observe directly whether the persons in question have
property X. So we need to rely on some proxy property Y that is correlated with property X to
make an inference about property X. Whenever we do so, we are relying on statistical
generalization. But we do not think reliance on statistical generalization is necessarily
unjustifiable. For instance, most universities require applicants to have a high school diploma or
equivalent based on the belief that there is strong correlation between high school diplomas and a
good command of the knowledge and skills that are necessary for studying in universities. It is
possible that there are some applicants without a high school diploma who can do as well as high
school graduates. In this sense, such an admission policy imposes cost on those applicants, which
might seem unfair. Still, few people find the universities’ policy unreasonable. Since this account
based on disadvantaging persons for the features of others does not distinguish wrongful
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instances of statistical discrimination from morally acceptable ones, it fails to satisfy criterion
(S2) and so should be judged inadequate.
3.3

The General-Wrong Approach
Compared with the distinct-wrong account, a better approach might be to explain the

wrong of statistical discrimination as part of general discrimination. According to this approach,
what makes statistical discrimination wrong, when it is wrong, is not the role of statistical
evidence, but something shared with other forms of wrongful discrimination. If so, it seems that
the question about what is wrong with statistical discrimination can be reduced to the question
about what is wrong with discrimination in general. Then all we would need to do is to apply the
theory about the wrong of discrimination per se to statistical discrimination. However, as my
following analysis will show, not all theories about the wrong of discrimination in general can
give a satisfactory account of the wrong of statistical discrimination. This is because while the
use of statistical evidence does not make statistical discrimination intrinsically wrong, it may still
make a moral difference, depending on how the wrongness of discrimination is understood. In
what follows, I examine some accounts of the wrong of discrimination in general and argue that
the accounts based on contribution to existing injustice have notable strengths compared with
other accounts.
3.3.1 The Account Based on Merit
Some scholars argue that discrimination is wrong because it violates the norm that we
must treat individuals based on their merits. An advocate for this account is David Miller, who
maintains, “Justice demands that the job be offered to the best-qualified applicant. We express
this by saying that the best-qualified applicant deserves the job or, in a slightly different
formulation, that the principle involved is one of merit. This is the principle that condemns
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discrimination on grounds of sex, race or religion when hiring employees” (2001, p.156).
However, Miller’s account is flawed. It is not clear what the criteria for judging who is the bestqualified are, and there might be different reasonable criteria that contradict each other. For
example, there might be different criteria for the job of high school teacher, depending on
different understanding of the role. Some may believe that the best-qualified teacher should be
flexible in grading and reward not only students’ performance but efforts, while others may
believe that the best-qualified teacher should take only students’ performance into account when
grading to avoid bias. It is debatable which criterion is better, but both seem reasonable. Besides,
this account does not apply to discrimination in areas that are not supposed to be competitive,
such as discrimination in policing. That is to say, violation of merit is unable to explain all
paradigm cases of discrimination.
Moreover, this account is especially problematic when it comes to statistical
discrimination. Statistical discrimination in employment often results from the attempt to find
out who is best qualified for a job. To illustrate, in the paradigm case (C1), the employer who
rejects women because of the statistical correlation between gender and productivity seems to be
pursuing rather than violating the norm requiring the choice of the best qualified (in this case, the
most productive) applicants, but his act still seems morally problematic. It suggests that obeying
the norm of merit does not preclude some instances of statistical discrimination from being
wrong, because violation of the norm of merit is absent in some paradigm cases of wrongful
statistical discrimination. Accordingly, the account based on merit fails to meet criterion (S1).
Some might say the employer is not really obeying the norm of merit. The point is more
obvious if the number is changed downward. An employer who skips looking at all women
candidates based on evidence that 10% percent of women are less qualified than men, can hardly
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be regarded as following the norm of merit, although he can claim he is hiring for merit. My
reply will be that numbers matters for the norm of merit. To obey the norm of merit, it is
required that the treatment is based on cogent generalization about merit. The generalization in
the revised example is not cogent, which arrives at the conclusion that women are likely to be
less qualified than men based on the premise that 10% of women are less qualified than men.
However, pursuit for merit can be grounded on generalization that is not, at least obviously, noncogent, thus accords to the norm of merit but is still morally problematic.
3.3.2 The Account Based on Objectionable Mental States
Another account of the wrong of discrimination is the one based on objectionable mental
states. The underlying principle for this account is that “what makes an action morally right
depends on whether it expresses the appropriate valuations of…persons,” where “expresses”
means “manifests a state of mind” (Anderson & Pildes, 2000, pp.1504-1506). Accordingly, what
makes discrimination wrong is the objectionable attitudes it expresses. Different versions of this
account ground the wrong of discrimination on different mental states, such as “unwarranted
animus and prejudice” (Arneson, 2006, p.779) or “unwarranted contempt” (Cavanagh, 2002,
p.166), and the belief that some social groups are morally less worthy than others (Alexander,
1992; Glasgow, 2009; Hellman, 2018).
This type of view also falls short in accounting for the wrong of statistical discrimination,
because wrongful statistical discrimination does not necessarily involve objectionable mental
states. That is to say, criterion (S1) is unmet. Does the employer in (C1) have any contempt or
prejudice against women, or hold that they are morally inferior to men? It is possible that he
does, but not necessarily. There is nothing contradictory in believing that women are of equal
moral worth to men and also believing the truth of a piece of statistical evidence from a reliable
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source that women generally have low productivity for certain jobs. It is even logically
consistent to believe in the correlation between social group membership and unfavorable traits
at the same time as believing that the social group in question has a high moral status. For
instance, male chauvinists who believe that men have more moral worth than women can
consistently believe that men are less likely to succeed in nursing.
A reply to my criticism might be that, although taking belief in the statistical correlation
between a certain social group and unfavorable traits does not presuppose prejudice or belief in
unequal moral status, acting on such a belief reflects indifference to the interests of members of
the disadvantaged group, which is also an objectionable attitude. For example, if an employer
who believes the evidence that women are less likely to succeed in a job requiring great physical
strength cares about the interests of women, then he should find ways to reduce the amount of
physical strength required by the job (e.g., implementing new female-friendly machines), rather
than reject female applicants. I think this reply is not very convincing. First, not taking measures
to promote the interests of women does not necessarily express indifference to women’s
interests. The employer may wish he could do something rather than rejecting female applicants,
but it is just too expensive to do so. Besides, although it is morally praiseworthy if an employer
takes positive measures to reduce the obstacle for women to succeed in a job at his own cost and
it may sometimes be obligatory for the employers to do so, undertaking such measure is not
generally a moral requirement on employers. In many cases those measures would involve undue
costs to the employers.
Overall, the account based on objectionable mental states cannot adequately explain the
wrong of statistical discrimination.
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3.3.3 Discrimination as Contributing to Existing Injustice
Instead of focusing on the subjective attitudes underlying discriminatory behaviors, an
alternative way to account for the wrong of discrimination is by looking at its consequences.
It is useful to compare discrimination and differential treatment that is not commonly
considered discriminatory. Consider the following two scenarios: (1) An employer rejects all
applicants with blood type AB because he personally dislikes persons with blood type AB, and
(2) An employer rejects all female applicants because he personally dislikes females. The
behavior of the employer in (1) does not count as discrimination under our definition, because
“persons with blood type AB” is not a socially salient group. Both scenarios involve wrongful
behavior, but it seems that the behavior of the employer in (2) is wrong in a distinct way, because
it is more pernicious. Given that the underlying mental states are similar (i.e., dislike for a
particular group), it is not the mental states per se that explain the difference. Then what does
explain the difference? I think it is the outcome of the treatments. The treatment in (2)
disadvantages the victim group in a distinct way, both economically and emotionally. Whereas
the applicants with type AB blood are rejected in (1) are likely to find a job elsewhere, the
female applicants may find themselves facing many other obstacles in job markets. The rejected
applicants in (1) might feel disappointed, embarrassed and annoyed at the employer, but it would
not be reasonable for them to experience strong feelings of stigma and powerlessness for being a
member of the group as the female applicants in (2) do.
The comparison suggests that the wrong of discrimination is determined by social
context, prominently including the historical injustice suffered by particular social groups. While
women have suffered systematic and structured oppression throughout history, persons with
blood type AB have not. Differential treatments targeted at those groups have the effect of
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reinforcing existing injustice towards the victim groups, which makes discrimination morally
wrong. Thomas Scanlon holds a view along this line of thought. He points out that the
distinctiveness of discrimination is that “the prejudicial judgments it involves are not just the
idiosyncratic attitudes of a particular agent but are widely shared in the society in question and
commonly expressed and acted on in ways that have serious consequences (Scanlon, 2009,
p.73).” That is to say, discrimination adds to the widespread biases towards historically
subordinated group, and actions based on such biases perpetuate such injustices and risk
worsening the position of persons already suffering undue disadvantage.
In my view, this theory about the wrong of general discrimination provides a plausible
account of what makes statistical discrimination wrong, if we consider how statistical
discrimination takes place and how it does harm to the society.
Many of the statistical correlations that motivate and are used to ground statistical
discrimination come into existence due to injustice in the past. For instance, the apparent
correlation between black people and high rates of crime8 on which racial profiling is based is
not a product of nature, but “as a result of the deprivation resulting from discrimination and
unjust, racial inequality” (Lippert-Rasmussen, 2006, p.194). Similarly, the supposed correlation
between females and low productivity, if it really exists, might be greatly influenced by the
“motherhood penalty” (Theunissen et al., 2011). Women of child-bearing age are likely to take
long parental leaves, and the disproportionate burden of parental duty has a negative impact on
female employee’s performance. At first glance, this might seem unrelated to social injustice,
since pregnancy is a natural trait of women. However, the natural traits of women are not
themselves necessarily disadvantages in employment. They can only constitute disadvantages

8

The correlation has been pointed out as dubious, because the police crime data may be distorted in itself. Here I set aside such
considerations, but it does not mean that I commit to the truthfulness of the claimed correlation.
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under certain social conditions. In our society, the relevant social conditions include (1)
workplaces routinely fail to provide reliable and affordable childcare, (2) mothers are expected to
undertake more responsibility of taking care of children, and (3) paternity leave is not as
prevalent as maternity leave in most contraries. As a result, the natural traits of women become
employment disadvantages. This is what MacKinnon (1987, pp.32-47) criticizes as a “male
standard”, where men’s physiology and need define the standard way to live and work in our
society. Conceive a possible society that is the same as the actual one except that there exists no
historical social injustice. There would still be differences between different social groups, but
the differences are not likely be so abundant or systematic as to ground statistical discrimination
that disadvantages a social group in a systematic way.
Consider one form of statistical discrimination that is increasingly having a great impact
on society, discrimination driven by algorithms, i.e., a sequence of well-defined, computerimplementable instructions. Given certain data input, an algorithm can solve problems and make
decisions. The use of algorithms is transforming the workplace. Many employers rely on
algorithms to determine who gets interviewed and whom to hire or promote (Kim, 2016).
Algorithms learn based on the data on which they are designed. Unable to distinguish
correlations that represent causal connections from correlations that are not themselves causal
but can be explained by a third-party cause or other underlying causal process, algorithms treat
instances of prejudice in training data as valid examples and simply perpetuate these injustices in
its outputs (Hayes et al., 2020, p.12). For example, suppose an algorithm is trained on a data pool
including gender and occupational information of a county’s population over the past ten years,
and it is asked to predict whether a candidate is likely to succeed in a leadership position. The
algorithm can easily detect that being male is correlated with higher possibility of becoming
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leaders and make decisions favoring male candidates over female candidates. The algorithm is
not able to distinguish the situation where females are intrinsically unsuitable for being a leader
and therefore have lower rates of taking leadership position, from the situation where there are
third-party factors that unjustifiably make it more difficult for women to get a leadership
position. The nature of algorithms is such that decisions based on them reflect and reinforce
existing social patterns. Therefore, without reference to such patterns and past injustice, we
would not be able to account for wrongful discrimination driven by algorithms.
Statistical discrimination adds to the existing injustice suffered by the subject group. This
is realized through a dual mechanism. First, statistical discrimination contributes to existing
injustice directly through causing disadvantageous outcomes for the group. For example,
statistical discrimination in the workplace increases the difficulty for members of minority
groups to get employment, salary raises, and promotion, preventing them from moving out of
poverty and improving their living conditions. These consequences, in turn, reduce their access
to good education and skill training, which then worsens their performance in the workplace,
creating a vicious circle. Statistical discrimination in education, housing, and services also
exacerbates the quality of life of minority groups. Besides the material disadvantages, statistical
discrimination causes reasonable feelings of powerless, stigma, resentment, hatred and other
traumatic experiences.
Second, statistical discrimination also contributes to existing injustice by expressing and
affirming the correlation between social group membership and unfavorable attributes, thereby
perpetuating certain forms of social injustice in a society with a history of injustice. There are
widespread stereotypes and biases against minority social groups. The social meaning of
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discrimination in such a society expresses the stereotypes and bias, thereby producing harmful
effects on people’s attitudes and behaviors towards the target social group.
One might ask how biased expressions produce a harmful influence on society, given that
the messages being expressed are something so widespread that almost everyone knows them. If
you express in public a stereotype that many people know, does it cause anything that cannot be
produced without you expressing the statement? Yes. Your expression works as a confirmation
that you endorse this statement, and it also causes other people to know that you endorse this
statement. It can have at least two consequences. First, your expression may make the statement
sound more convincing to those who do not believe in it and may add to their tendency to start
endorsing the statement. Second, even if other people may already endorse this statement before
you express it, your expression can strengthen their belief in the statement and make it harder for
them to give up their belief in the statement in the future. Biased expression can produce effects
that would not be present without it, and this kind of effect can be greater if the message is
expressed by a subject with authority or expertise, such as government or other public
institutions.
In the case of wrongful discrimination, the messages being expressed reflect unjustifiable
biases against certain social group. Those expressions serve to strengthen people’s beliefs in such
biases and motivate people to act on those beliefs. For example, employers in a society where
employment discrimination against women is prevalent tend to offer better salaries, promotions
and opportunities to male employees, because such discrimination expresses the message that
women are unproductive and incompetent and adds to the employers’ beliefs in the message.
Sometimes those beliefs can even be unconscious, such as in the phenomenon of implicit bias
(Greenwald &Banaji, 1995). An implicit bias is an unconscious attitude where people attribute
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certain qualities to all members of a particular group. Because they operate on an unconscious
level, such biases are much less controllable than explicit biases. In this way, statistical
discrimination based on implicit biases helps existing prejudice and bias proliferate in society,
making it even more difficult to eliminate social injustice.
Overall, instead of alternative accounts, we have reasons to prefer a consequentialist
account of the wrong of statistical discrimination that conceptualizes it as an instance of the
wrong of general discrimination, namely, the wrong of reinforcing existing injustice toward
disadvantaged social groups in a given social context. This consequentialist account avoids the
pitfalls of other accounts, including those that focus on disadvantaging persons for features they
do not have, those that focus on merits, and those that appeal to objectionable mental states.
Those accounts have no easy way to explain the wrong of the paradigm case of wrongful
statistical discrimination and allow ordinary use of statistical generalization to be justifiable at
the same time. The consequentialist account, on the other hand, better tracks the cause and
influence of statistical discrimination.

4

RACIAL PROFILING: A HARD CASE

In this section I am going to elaborate on the account of the wrong of statistical
discrimination I defended in last section, by examining a specific and controversial form of such
discrimination, namely, racial profiling by police. The focus of my examination is a prominent
account of profiling given by Eidelson. His account fits well with my analysis of statistical
discrimination, because it is also an argument that focuses on the effects of policies on existing
racial injustices. I aim to explain and defend Eidelson’s argument against racial profiling, as an
illustration of how a context-based consequentialist approach can shed light on this hard case of
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statistical discrimination. The analysis can serve as further support to the context-based
consequentialist account of the wrong of statistical discrimination, by showing how the account
reveals and highlights morally troubling dimensions of racial profiling that other accounts may
fail to discuss.
I structure this section into four parts. I start by explaining the concept of racial profiling.
Next, I survey some non-consequentialist arguments against racial profiling. The third part
explains Eidelson’s main argument against profiling, and in the last part, I defend Eidelson’s
account of profiling by responding to some objections to his argument that he did not anticipate
or address.
4.1

The Definition of Racial Profiling
A typical definition for racial profiling is proposed by Risse and Zackhauser (2004,

p.136), according to whom profiling refers to “any police-oriented action that relies on the race,
ethnicity, or national origin and not merely on the behavior of an individual”. Eidelson does not
adopt this definition directly, nor does he present an explicit definition of racial profiling by
himself. Instead, he tries to reveal the nature of racial profiling by examining two general police
strategies for detecting and identifying criminals, namely, profiling (whether or not it is linked to
race) and suspect description (Eidelson, 2015, pp.178-187). When police engage in profiling,
they “use traits that they take to be associated with the commission of some kind of offense as
sorting criteria to allocate investigative resources more efficiently” (Eidelson, 2015, p.178).
When police employ a suspect description, they “use traits thought to be possessed by a specific
suspect as criteria for allocating investigative resources more efficiently” (Eidelson, 2015,
p.178). As Eidelson suggests, what really distinguishes profiles from suspect descriptions is their
inferential structure. Suspect descriptions do not rely on generalizations about the relationship
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between criminality and a trait. What a suspect description says is that a person with a particular
trait is more likely to be the perpetrator in a particular case. By contrast, profiles suppose the
existence of a general connection between the trait in question and criminality. What a profile
says is that a person with a particular trait (a particular race in the case of racial profiling) is
more likely to commit a certain kind of crime.
Incorporating the elements of Risse and Zeckhauser’s definition and Eidelson’s analysis,
I formulate a definition of racial profiling as police-oriented action that relies on an assumption
about the relationship between race and criminality.
4.2

The Problems Faced by Non-Consequentialist Arguments against Racial Profiling
Before discussing the consequentialist argument against profiling proposed by Eidelson,

it is worth looking at some non-consequentialist arguments. As I discuss in Section 3, the
accounts of the wrong of statistical discrimination based on disadvantaging persons for features
they do not have, on merit, or on objectionable mental states, each face some dilemmas. Those
accounts might nevertheless face fewer or no problems explaining racial profiling, since
profiling is just one particular instance of statistical discrimination. If non-consequentialist
approaches can offer a satisfactory explanation of when and why profiling is wrong, then the
consequentialist account of profiling will not have any advantage on that score and may even
prove to be worse.
The account based on merit clearly does not apply to the case of racial profiling, because
profiling is not an instance of discrimination where merit should be the standard for selection.
Turning to objectionable mental states, although individual police may be motived by racist
attitudes in implementing racial profiling, either consciously or unconsciously, it is not necessary
that all policies of profiling are adopted for contempt or prejudice towards racial minorities. It is
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possible that a police officer who believes that black Americans have a higher crime rate and
implements the policy of profiling also believes that the higher crime rate is just a result of the
race’s social condition rather than innate essence. The account based on objectionable mental
states seem to fall short in explaining such cases, because there are no objectional mental states
harbored by the discriminator.
The account based on disadvantaging persons for features they are do not have and are
therefore not responsible for seems to be a more reasonable explanation for what is wrong with
racial profiling. Even though the crime rate of black Americans as a group may be higher than
that of white Americans, most black Americans do not commit crime. By using race as indicator
for crime, the innocent black Americans who are profiled are disadvantaged in virtue of crimes
they have never done. Still, as I have pointed out, this account applies to any case of statistical
generalization, including those that we do not regard as problematic.
Eidelson considers one type of argument against profiling that is somewhat similar to the
previous one: it contends that racial profiling is wrong because a person cannot alter, and
therefore is not responsible for, his race.9 It is unfair to impose disadvantages on persons for
features they cannot change and for which they are not responsible. Eidelson invites us to
consider why people believe that it would be fairer to burden a person based on mutable traits
than immutable traits. He suggests that this is because we assume that when a policy burdens a
person based on mutable traits, the cost to her of abandoning or suspending the trait is less than
the cost of accepting the burden imposed by the policy (Eidelson, 2015, p.191). Therefore,

9

This paper does not examine racial essentialism, but even for those who embrace such views, the claim
that race cannot be altered is problematic. For those who deny the claim that race is immutable, the objection against
profiling based on immutability of race does not work. What Eidelson shows here is that this objection cannot
succeed even if we grant the assumption that race is immutable.
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Eidelson contends, what would make profiling wrong, according to the logic of this argument, is
not really the immutability of race, but the magnitude of burdens it imposes on people.
Overall, non-consequentialist accounts face problems explaining when and why racial
profiling is morally troubling, for which consideration of a consequentialist account might be
helpful.
4.3

The Harm Arguments against Racial Profiling
Eidelson develops an elaborate argument against racial profiling that explains the wrong

of profiling in virtue of its consequences. He labels his argument as “the Harm Argument.” The
main idea is that racial profiling is unjustified because its costs outweigh its benefits. Eidelson
(2015, p. 197) further distinguishes two forms of the Harm Argument. The Narrow Harm
Argument focuses on the harm that profiling does to those who are subjected to police scrutiny.
The Broad Harm Argument, in contrast, considers the harms of profiling to the people who
experienced police scrutiny and to those who never encounter the police but are members of the
race that is subject to profiling. Eidelson takes the Broad Harm Argument to be the more
forceful.
Eidelson classifies the harms that profiling imposes on subjects of police scrutiny
according to whether or not the harms are belief-dependent. Belief-independent harms include
any delay or inconvenience caused by the scrutiny: these harms occur regardless of whether one
believes that one has been profiled. Belief-dependent harms include feelings of stigma and
humiliation and are dependent on the belief that one is subject to profiling, rather than on
whether they are actually profiled. For example, a black male driver may reasonably believe he
is racially profiled and experience feelings of stigma and humiliation when being searched by
police on the road, even if the search is in fact done to every male driver including white men.
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This is because, given the prevalence of racial profiling in the current society, it is reasonable for
him to think that the additional scrutiny is based on race. As Eidelson put it, one’s belief about
whether she is profiled based on race “is more likely driven by her beliefs about the presence or
absence of racial profiling in general” (Eidelson, 2015, p.199). In a society where profiling is a
common practice of institutions, people of minority races are reasonably inclined to interpret any
police search they are subject to as profiling. Consequently, belief-dependent harms can
influence more people than those who are actually profiled.
More importantly, the harms of racial profiling are not limited to the harms against the
people it affects directly but also extends to the harm of members of the target group who have
never been subject to police scrutiny. This is what Eidelson highlights in the Broad Harm
Argument. According to him, there are three concerns on which the Broad Harm Argument
focuses (Eidelson, 2015, pp.207-208). First, a policy of profiling made known to the public
conveys a demeaning and stigmatizing message about the target group, which directly injures
members of the group in general, even if they are not actually profiled or believe they are
profiled. Second, such a policy will influence other people’s attitudes towards the target group,
and those attitudes will disadvantage members of the group. Third, the harm of profiling to the
target group will cause increasing resentment and hostility of members of the group toward the
rest of the society, leading to racial hatred and social unrest. Eidelson believes that “the Broad
Harm Argument likely furnishes a decisive objection against racial profiling in very many of the
cases where it might be practiced” (Eidelson, 2015, p. 207). I focus my analysis on this
argument.
The key to Eidelson’s Broad Harm argument is the social meaning of racial profiling.
The Broad Harm Argument relies on the premise that the social meaning of profiling is such that
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it causally contributes to reinforcing or increasing racism. One might ask why the social meaning
of profiling has such effects. Eidelson makes several points that address the question. First, the
inferential structure of profiling determines its social meaning. This is shown by the contrast
between profile and suspect description. Racial profiling rests on the assumption that a person
with a particular race is more likely to commit a kind of crime, which is absent in suspect
description (Eidelson, 2015, p.209). However, the inferential structure alone does not make the
social meaning of profiling racist. After all, given that the correlation between race and crime
rate does exist, which is the assumption of my discussion, what a policy of profiling “says”
would apparently be just describing the world accurately. How does accurately describing the
world contribute to racism?
Eidelson’s explanation is that people tend to interpret the meaning of racial profiling in a
racist way due to cognitive confusion. As he puts it:
For a profile to be useful, the possession of a particular trait must only raise the
epistemic probability that a person is a criminal. But the distinction between a
trait’s making one (epistemically) more likely to be a drug courier, and its actually
making one more likely to be a drug courier, is predictably lost on many people
(Eidelson, 2015, p.210).
In other words, the original assumption on which a policy of profiling is based may be different
from the message that people receive from the policy. A policy of profiling can function without
making any assumption about the causal relationship between race and criminality. All it
depends on is the statistically positive correlation between the two variables. This point can be
illustrated with Eidelson’s model (Eidelson, 2015, pp.212-213). Assume that a person, x, will
commit a crime at time t when 𝐶!,# > 𝑇# , where 𝐶!,# refers to the crime-conduciveness of the
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person’s circumstances at time t and 𝑇# refers to the person’s overall threshold for how
conducive a circumstance must be for him to commit the crime. What profiling supposes is that
black Americans are more likely to be in a state where 𝐶!,# > 𝑇# compared with white Americans.
It is neutral about whether black Americans have a higher 𝑇# than white Americans. That is, it
does not suppose that the higher crime rates of black Americans are caused by deep-seated
differences internal to race. Nevertheless, human cognitive machinery is such that people are
disposed to interpret races as “natural kinds” (Cosmides et al., 2003, pp. 173-179.). The
psychological hypothesis that racial categories are biologically robust and homogeneous will
push people towards explaining the different crime rates in terms of a different 𝑇# between black
Americans and white Americans, rather than different social circumstances they experience.
Consequently, people tend to interpret the meaning of profiling as confirming the different racial
essence of blacks and whites: black people are then taken to be intrinsically more prone to
commit crimes. This is how a policy of racial profiling obtains a racist social meaning and
causally contributes to the existence of racism in society.
4.4

Objections and Replies
In this part, I discuss some objections to Eidelson’s arguments that he did not analyze but

pose a challenge to his account. I argue that these objections can be replied within the framework
of the account.
4.4.1 Underestimation of Benefits
The first line of objection questions whether the harm of racial profiling actually
outweighs its benefit. Eidelson seems to take it for granted that once we recognize the social
meaning of profiling and how it influences members of the profiled group and the rest of society,
it would be self-evident that its harm is more significant than its usefulness. He writes that
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“racial profiling is objectionable for the simple reason that it encourages racism, and that this
harm will often outweigh whatever benefits it achieves” (Eidelson, 2015, p.214), but he does not
elaborate on why it is the case. Opponents of his argument may think that Eidelson
underestimates the benefits that profiling can bring. For example, Neven Sesardić argues that the
price of not implementing racial profiling in the fight by the police against violent crime is very
high. The situations Sesardić imagines are crimes of great violence whose prevention is matter of
urgency, such as the scenario where a criminal with a deadly weapon is about to initiate an attack
on a crowd, and the police cannot afford to spend the time searching every suspect. Sesardić
suggests that the police officers or innocent bystanders in such a scenario are in grave danger and
“their life will be put at much higher risk if the suspected attacker’s race is not taken into account
when deciding how to respond”10 (Sesardić, 2018, p.998).
I think this objection is not cogent. Eidelson does not say that all forms of racial profiling
are unjustifiable. His argument against profiling is a consequentialist one. Whether a particular
case of profiling should be allowed is determined by considering the specific conditions. Various
instances of racial profiling differ in how immediate the supposed criminal threat is, how serious
the crime is, and the population it influences. Exceptional cases in extreme situations when a
serious threat is posed to people’s lives, such as the search for a serial killer or terrorist who
might strike imminently, might still justify the use of racial profiling. Even so, Eidelson’s
criticism could still apply to most cases of profiling. For instance, the benefits of traffic stops and
searches targeted at black people for drugs or illegal weapons can hardly outweigh their
One might think this claim counterintuitive. Presumably if one is in a dangerous situation focusing on what the
particular individual is doing seems more important than noting the race of the person. If the guy is waving a gun
around, it is more important you notice that than what race the fellow is. To clarify, what Sesardić insists on here is
not that police should not take into account factors other than race, nor that race is more important than particular
features indicating the chance of violence. What he maintains is that given the same particular features, race should
still be considered. For example, when two men are both waving a gun, Sesardić believes it is rational to predict the
black man is more dangerous than the white man.
10
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contribution to racism, considering that there are alternative strategies to effectively curb illegal
drug or weapon possession, and the crimes do not pose an immediate threat to the public. The
preventive screening of persons of a particular race at airports to catch terrorists does not seem to
be beneficial enough to outweigh its harm either. Airports can strengthen security by adding
security forces, installing weapon detectors, and implementing comprehensive screenings for
every passenger.
4.4.2 The Meaning of Social Profiling Can Be Non-Racist
Another objection may come from those who doubt whether the social meaning of racial
profiling has to be racist, as Eidelson suggests. As I have noted, the assumption of racial
profiling is neutral about what causes different crime rates between races (assuming, for the sake
of argument, that such differences exist). If the original meaning (contrasted with the social
meaning) of a policy is the assumption on which it is based, then the original meaning of
profiling is just that the crime rate of black Americans is higher than that of white Americans. If
the difference between the crime rates of black Americans and white Americans does exist, then
the original meaning of profiling represents an accurate description of the world, which is not
racist in nature.11 If what makes racial profiling objectionable is not its original meaning, but
people’s interpretation of it, then instead of banning the policy itself, the government should
make efforts to correct people’s understanding of it.
Nevertheless, this policy suggestion would not be practical. As Eidelson (2015, p.212)
points out and is also supported by psychological research (Quattrone & Jones,1980; Judd &
Park, 1991; McGarty, 1999), there is an underlying cognitive mechanism that naturally pushes

11

Here I suppose the meaning of crime is not biased by racism. In a racist society, it is possible for the definition of
what counts as crime to be skewed in a way that unjustly disadvantages racial minorities.
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people to think of a racial outgroup as homogenous. This mechanism determines that white
Americans are disposed to view black Americans as similar in their tendency to commit crimes,
rather than regard the higher crime rates as reflecting mere differences in people’s circumstances.
It would be difficult to reverse the human psychological machinery that is likely to be carved by
genes. Besides the cognitive mechanism, the social context is also important for determining the
social meaning of racial profiling. Consider gender profiling targeted at men based on the
assumption that men are more likely to commit crimes than women. Since gender is also often
regarded as a robust category, people also tend to interpret the meaning of gender profiling as
suggesting that men are intrinsically more violent and crime-prone than women. Still, few people
find gender profiling as objectionable as racial profiling. This is because men as a group are
regarded as dominant and superior. The crime-proneness of men is not linked to inferiority.
Instead, it may be seen as an expression of suitable aggressiveness and power, a typical part of
the conventional image of what men ought to be. By contrast, there is widespread disrespect
towards black Americans, who are perceived to be inferior to white Americans. In such context,
violence is regarded as confirmation of black Americans’ inferiority; thus, “affirming the notion
that race is predictive of criminality…is conventionally disrespectful,” even in the absence of
disrespectful intention (Eidelson, 2015, p.186, Emphasis in original). Therefore, to correct the
social meaning of racial profiling, we would also need to change the social context and reduce
the existing discrimination against black Americans. This would be a long-term and complex
program.12

12

In fact, a strong case can be made that by the time that discrimination against black people is eliminated, there
will not likely to be a great difference between the crime rates of blacks and whites. Then there would be no need to
correct the social meaning of racial profiling, because there would be no need to implement racial profiling at all.
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4.4.3 Racial profiling and Perception
A third kind of objection, one that I think most forceful, is based on the distinction
between the practice of racial profiling and the perception of it. As Eidelson points out, the major
harm of profiling is belief-dependent. Without the belief that one’s own group is being the target
of profiling, members of the profiled groups are not likely to have the feeling of hurt, stigma and
resentment. Without the belief that certain minority groups are the target of profiling, members
of the other groups are not likely to reinforce their racist attitudes against the minority groups.
That is to say, most of the harmful consequences related with profiling depend on people’s
perception of profiling, rather than profiling itself. If what matters is whether people believe
profiling is employed, then is not it possible to preserve profiling itself without producing high
social costs? In fact, one can doubt whether Eidelson’s argument is a case against racial
profiling at all. Most of the harms that he describes (except the delay and inconvenience caused
by additional scrutiny) would only occur if there is public perception of profiling. In other words,
whether the Harm Argument applies is independent of whether there actually is profiling at all.
So it seems that what Eidelson shows is not that racial profiling itself is wrong, but that the
public perception of profiling causes wrongful harm.
I agree that Eidelson’s argument is, strictly speaking, against the perception rather than
the practice of profiling, but it does not mean his conclusion about the immorality of profiling in
the current society fails. Given the social conditions of the current US, most racial profiling
cannot be morally justified and will remain unjustifiable at least in the near term. These social
conditions include several aspects. First, the history of the US is such that black Americans have
suffered injustice and oppression economically, socially and institutionally. Second, there are
prevalent discriminatory and disrespectful attitudes towards black Americans that conceive them

WHAT IS WRONG WITH STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION?

32

as violent, dangerous and inferior. Despite efforts of civil right activists to alter these attitudes,
the attitudes remain entrenched and will continue to exist in the long run. Third, although it is
possible to separate the practice of racial profiling and the perception of it in theory, in the real
world, perception and practice are inextricably intertwined. People invariably notice that one
race is being searched by police more than the other race. If government were to falsely deny that
it practices racial profiling, the denial would be met by widespread incredulity and criticism. In
sum, even though the harmful consequences of profiling are largely mediated by social
perceptions, entrenched social realities mean that the elimination of such consequences cannot be
reasonably expected anytime soon.

5

CONCLUSION

Overall, my thesis argues that a context-based consequentialist account is a promising
explanation for the wrong of statistical discrimination. The distinct-wrong approach to
understanding the wrong of statistical discrimination, holding that it consists in the use of
statistical evidence, is misguided because it cannot demarcate morally wrongful statistical
discrimination from the justifiable use of statistical generalizations. Among the different versions
of the general-wrong approach, I have maintained that a consequentialist account is preferable to
the accounts based on merit or objectionable mental states. Specifically, I argued that the wrong
of statistical discrimination should be explained in terms of its effect of contributing to and
reinforcing the unjust subordination of disadvantaged social groups in a given social context.
To provide further support for my account, I showed that the context-based
consequentialist account can provide an illuminating way to reveal the morally troubling features
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of racial profiling by defending Eidelson’s argument against profiling, which is a version of
consequentialist account. The wrongfulness of racial profiling is determined by the harmful
consequences that it produces, in particular, the perpetuation and reinforcement of racism.
As a final remark, I would like to make some clarifications on my account. First, the
account relies on some controversial empirical claims that not all reasonable people will agree
with, such as the assumptions about the impact of racial profiling on society. My argument
would be weakened if those empirical assumptions prove to be false. Still, the assumptions are
plausible and reflect widely held understandings of US society among informed people. Second,
what I offer is only a preliminary defense for the context-based consequentialist account. My
argument does not rebut alternative accounts of the wrong of discrimination or establish that my
account is the only plausible one. My goal is just to show that a context-based consequentialist
account has notable strengths compared to alternatives. Third, my argument does not preclude
the possibility that there is more than one source of the moral wrong of wrongful statistical
discrimination. It is possible that some instances of statistical discrimination are wrong for both
consequentialist and deontological reasons. My claim here is that the consequentialist account
gives a reasonably convincing explanation of the wrongfulness of at least some notable instances
of wrongful statistical discrimination.
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